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Abstract. DNS is a distributed, fault tolerant system that avoids a sin-
gle point of failure. As such it is an integral part of the internet as we use
it today and hence deemed a safe protocol which is let through firewalls
and proxies with no or little checks. This can be exploited by malicious
agents. Network forensics is effective but struggles due to size of data
and manual labour. This paper explores to what extent predictive mod-
els can be used to predict network traffic, what protocols are tunneled
in the DNS protocol and more specifically whether the predictive perfor-
mance is enhanced when analyzing DNS-queries and responses together
and which feature set that can be used for DNS-tunneled network predic-
tion. The tested protocols are SSH, SFTP and Telnet and the machine
learning models used are Multi Layered Perceptron and Random Forests.
To train the models we extract the IP Packet length, Name length and
Name entropy of both the queries and responses in the DNS traffic. With
an experimental research strategy it is empirically shown that the per-
formance of the models increases when training the models on the query
and respose pairs rather than using only queries or responses. The accu-
racy of the models is > 83% and reduction in data size when features are
extracted is roughly 95%. Our results provides evidence that machine
learning is a valuable tool in detecting network protocols in a DNS tun-
nel and that only an small subset of network traffic is needed to detect
this anomaly.
Keywords: Network Forensics · Machine Learning · Predictive Models
· DNS Tunneling · Protocol Tunneling · Digital Investigations
1 Introduction
The Internet Protocol (IP) [28] can be used to send IP-packages between com-
puters in an interconnected network. These IP-packages can be freely inspected
by anyone handling the package, and be used to handle data delivery needed for
a variety of different protocols, such as the Domain Name System (DNS). DNS
is today an integral and important part of the Internet and it is the protocol
that resolves domain names. If DNS did not exist as a translator between hu-
mans and computers, for every website a user wanted to visit they would have
to know the IP-address of the computer that hosts that particular website [2].
Easily recognizable names, such as www.wikipedia.org, is easier to remember for
humans than an IP-address, such as 207.142.131.234. The DNS system is the
backbone of the World Wide Web (WWW) as we use it today [7].
As such, the DNS system is a distributed, fault tolerant system that avoids
a single point of failure. A client iterates queries to DNS servers until it gets a
response for the queried endpoint, for instance a web server. If a DNS server does
not have the IP-address for a queried endpoint it simply responds with another
DNS server that might have the correct IP-address.
The practice of tunneling network traffic means that the data that is to be
transported over a network is chopped up into smaller pieces called Protocol
Data Unit (PDU), encapsulated with a header for the specific protocol. Depend-
ing on how many protocols are involved in transporting the data the process
of encapsulating a PDU can be done several times before it is transported to
another computer over the network. The receiving computer then puts the data
back together by decapsulating the data according to the specified protocol(s)
used.
As described here tunneling of network traffic is the usual way of transporting
data across a network. Protocols such as the Secure Shell protocol (SSH) allows
communication between computers using encryption techniques over an insecure
network [33]. By tunneling the activities on the remote computer through the
SSH protocol a remote user can connect to, perform actions and see the result
of those actions as if they were performed on the users local computer.
However, the same technique, to tunnel network traffic, can be used to hide
malicious traffic in a standardized protocol by repackaging the malicious traffic
to look like normal traffic. By repackaging for instance a SSH connection to
look like DNS traffic and sending that traffic over the network any software or
computer looking at that traffic will see it as DNS traffic. This is done in order to
circumvent firewalls or proxies to be able to compromise networks or individual
computers [14].
The type of malicious traffic that exploits standardized protocols, like DNS,
can hide their traffic inside these protocols since they are usually let through
the outer perimeter of any LAN guarded by a firewall with no, or few, checks
as described by Xu, Butler, Saha, and Yao [32]. The normal checks performed
on network traffic by firewalls and proxies before allowing access to resources
are not performed on DNS since it is deemed a safe protocol only relaying DNS
lookups to local computers [8].
This type of stealthy network traffic can focus on hiding traffic between
malware and their servers, which is common among botnets, as well as sending
sensitive data to malicious agents or mapping out an organizations LAN [32].
Network forensics in this area, that is work being conducted in order to detect
malicious network traffic, is mostly focusing on reactive measures which entails
storing large amounts of network traffic for time consuming manual analysis,
requiring skill and storage space which could implicate privacy problems [11, p.
19-21].
Machine learning is the use of algorithms to build, or train, mathematical
models based on a sample set of data in order to be able to make predictions or
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decisions without being explicitly programmed for that task. Machine learning
algorithms are used in a wide variety of applications such as spam email filtering
or face recognition in pictures. [3, p. 1-2]
1.1 Problem
Automatically detecting tunneled, malicious traffic has been tried and the re-
sults shows promise. Born and Gustafson [8] matched Zipfian distribution of the
English language to the character frequency of the network traffic to detect DNS
tunnels. Homem and Papapetrou [19] and Homem, Papapetrou, and Dosis [20]
have used machine learning to find what protocols where tunneled in through
the DNS protocol with an accuracy of ≥ 90% detection rate for the tested pro-
tocols. Despite the efforts in this research area, detecting tunneled traffic in a
standardized protocol, using machine learning models is a somewhat neglected
area apart from [19] which has focused on four protocols; HTTP, FTP, HTTPS,
POP3 and using four predictive models: K-NN, Decision Trees, SVM and Multi-
nomial Neural Networks. Also, the datasets that has been utilized in previous
research has been rather small limiting the research to a rather narrow spectrum
of traffic type.
Although the efforts of Homem and Papapetrou [19] shows promise, as men-
tioned above it uses only a small dataset with just a few protocols which limits
them to a small set of features such as DNS Query Name Entropy, DNS Query
Name Length and the IP Packet Length for data mining, only using information
from the DNS-queries and neglecting the responses. Based on the above there
exist a knowledge gap in the area of detecting tunneled, malicious network traffic
with predictive models posing a need for a comprehensive experiment where a
broad dataset in terms of traffic type is utilized to gain new insights to what
features are important, especially since Homem and Papapetrou [19] did not
experiment with protocols such as SSH, SFTP or Telnet among others.
1.2 Contributions
The main contributions of this paper are:
New features and combinations While earlier research such as Homem and
Papapetrou [19] and Nadler et al. [25] has shown the effectiveness of their
proposed methods, they have not done any comparisons between different
feature-sets. They don’t make any attempts to analyze the inherit query-
response structure from the DNS protocol. This paper compares the different
model’s and feature-sets accuracy and show that the predictions are better
when analyzing the query and the response packets together.
Next level network forensics We present a basic Network Forensic Tool1
that can be used as a post mortem tool for Network Forensics to detect
tunneled DNS-traffic and is able to analyze DNS-queries and responses as
1 https://gitlab.com/vt19/networkforensictool
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pairs. This allows feature-sets that corresponds to the inherit query-response
structure of the DNS protocol. Adding to the flexibility in the feature-set con-
struction, setting it apart from tools such as the ones presented by Homem
and Papapetrou [19].
2 Related work
Below we summarize related work in DNS tunnels, Network forensics and Ma-
chine Learning.
Botnets i.e. sets of computers that are infected by a specific malware allow-
ing them to be remote controlled are a major security issue on the Internet.
Since the Command and Control (C&C) is a defining characteristic of botnets,
techniques have been developed to detect bot infections by identifying the C&C
network traffic [13]. Botnet operators have tried different structures to improve
the resilience of their C&C. The botnet Feederbot have adapted by abusing the
DNS protocol and uses DNS tunneling for its C&C [13].
The DNS protocol provides a distributed infrastructure for storing, updating
and disseminating data that conveniently fits the need for a C&C system. Not
only does it provide a means of communication between computers, but also
mechanisms for naming, locating, distributing and caching resources with fault
tolerance. [32]
Table 1: DNS records suitable for use in DNS tunneling [32]. Note that without
EDNS0 the entire response of the query, which includes the query and response,
must be smaller than 512 bytes.[1,2]
DNS tunneling data holders
Record Name Max Size Description
CNAME 255 a domain name
MX 255 a 16 bit preference value (lower is better) followed by a host
name willing to act as a mail exchange for the owner domain.
TXT 255 used to hold descriptive text
EDNS0 an extension that allows a payload bigger than the original
512-byte maximum.[10] When a capable server or client en-
counters this field, it can decode the packets, allowing several
improvements to the basic DNS protocol. These features in-
clude larger UDP packet size, a list of attribute value pairs,
and several extra bytes for commonly used flags.
The DNS system allows a name server administrator to associate different
types of data with either a fully qualified domain name or an IP address. To
send a message to a bot, an adversary can store data in any one of these types of
records described in table 1. These records can be used by the clients to establish
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a two-way transfer of data by encoding queries to the server, which then can send
data back encoded in the records. [32]
The purpose of Network Forensics is to monitor and analyze network traffic
for information gathering. This information can be used for legal or intrusion
detection purposes. Network traffic as such is volatile and dynamic meaning
investigations in this area needs to be pro-active [27].
There is only so much information stored in log files and if an attacker has
erased the logs there will be a hard time retracing the attackers actions and
entry point into the system. This means that forensics in this area either needs
to collect and store real-time data for later analysis or try to analyze the data as
it flows through the network. The collection of data can cause privacy concerns
in itself as questions such as Who will collect it, When or how often it should
be collected and What is to be collected [27, p. 29]. This collected traffic is
then analyzed by a forensic analyst, often manually which is time consuming,
error-prone and can constitute serious privacy issues [11, p. 19-21]
The scalability of a Network Forensics Tool where large amounts of data needs
to be stored centrally on a forensic server is an critical issue that is discussed
by Khan, Gani, Wahab, Shiraz, and Ahmad [22]. Any tools used in network
forensics needs to improve on the manual labour put down in order to be a
viable option and considering the amount of network traffic that is generated
today needs to scale to handle large amounts of data.
Considering the amount of data that is transmitted in modern networks it is
bound to be a lot of noise, i.e. data or information that is not malicious and not
of real interest to an analyst. This data would also most likely contain sensitive
information such as passwords or even financial records further increasing the
privacy issues, both personal and organizational. [22, p. 231]
The research of Liao, Tian, and Wang [24, p. 1883] using fuzzy set [34] logic
on extracted features of the collected network data show that only parts of the
data is actually needed to detect malicious traffic. This is in accordance with
Homem and Papapetrou [19] findings and would address at least some of the
privacy issues stated earlier. However, Liao et al. [24] results also show that the
computing costs of extracting new fuzzy rules is large which could lead to new
attacks not being detected in time. This is still better than the manual analysis
performed on collected data and the use of machine learning could act as a sieve
on large amounts of data for an analyst to only look at the parts of traffic that
are likelier of being significant for forensic research.
To classify the data Homem and Papapetrou [19] got their best results using
Multinomial Neural Networks where they used a Multi-Layer Perceptron (MLP)
to classify the dataset. The MLP is trained by a already classified dataset and
are presented to a feed-forward back-propagation neural network, with every
feature having a input node and every classifier a respective output node [26].
Each node has a response f(wtx) where x is the vector of output activations from
the preceding layer, w is a vector of weights and f is a bounded nondecreasing
nonlinear function, i.e. the sigmoid [29, p. 31].
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Other interesting potential techniques include random forest. Random forest
are a combination of tree predictors such that each tree depends on the values of
a random vector sampled independently with the same distribution for all trees
in the forest. Where the classification function simply output the most popular
answer among the trees when given a data-point. The Random forests can be
constructed by giving every tree a randomly selected input set and training it
using random tree specific choice of features. Such random forests produce good
results in classification. [9]
The use of entropy measurement is an interesting feature that can be used
quite effectively to classify DNS-traffic as DNS-tunneled. [20]. The entropy can
be measured by Shannon’s entropy formula, H(X) = −
∑n
k=1 pk ∗ lne pk where
X is constructed by an alphabet {x1, x2, ..., xn} and pk is the relative frequency
for the respective characters. [6, pp. 59-61]
2.1 Recent research
Although there is recent research in the area exploring different approaches to
detecting and classifying protocols within tunnels of other protocols such as Dusi
et al. [14] who try to distinguish normal HTTP and SSH traffic from malicious
tunnels. Alshammari and Zincir-Heywood [4] used classifiers such as Adaboost
to try and detect the actual application traffic such as X11 in an SSH-tunnel.
Research not focusing on tunneling per se but at identification of obfuscated
protocols, that is protocols that makes it harder to identify them by i.e. ran-
domizing their payload, is notably Hjelmvik and John [17]. In their research
they could correctly identify ≥ 90% of a large part of the tested protocols with
the Kullback-Leibler divergence [23] on subsets of extracted features from the
collected network traffic data.
In their study examining how well the entropy of DNS-tunneled traffic could
be predicted using a simple MeanDiff prediction Homem et al. [20] were able
to make quite accurate classifications. In a later study Homem and Papapetrou
[19] expanded upon the previous study, studying the accuracy of four common
machine learning techniques to classify different traffic. They used k-Nearest-
Neighbour (k-NN), Decision Trees, Support Vector Machines (SVMs) and Neu-
ral Networks, upon a dataset of HTTP, FTP, HTTPS and POP3 through a
DNS-tunnel reduced to three factors. These specific factors were DNS Query
Name Entropy, DNS Query Name Length, and the IP Packet Length. With this
approach they were able to reach at least 90% accuracy classifying the traffic.
[19]
3 Network traffic classification Work flow
According to sound, robust and transparent research methodology principles, a
strategy is necessary when conducting research. This is important as it formalizes
the way in which the research itself is conducted and therefore gives a certain
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amount of validity and reliability as it makes the research reproducible for others
to either expand on or control earlier research results [16].
In our experiments the following work flow was followed:
1. Record DNS traffic with a tool such as tcpdump
2. Extract the desired features with a Network Forensic Tool
3. Apply a Machine Learning model on the extracted features
4. Evaluate the results
3.1 Evaluation methodology
The findings of this paper is evaluated using the metrics Accuracy (ACC), Pre-
cision (P) and Recall (R). These metrics uses the True Positives (TP), True
Negatives (TN), False Positives (FP) and False Negatives (FN) in calculating
how well the predictive models perform.
A 20-fold cross-validation was used to evaluate the algorithms consisting
of the models feature-sets and compared against the results of the Multinomial
Neural Networks using the [19] featureset. The 20-fold cross-validation technique
consists in splitting a dataset in 20 independent subsets: in turn all but one of
these subsets are used to train a classifier, while the remaining one is used to
evaluate the generalization error [5]. We will use the models and feature-sets
presented in table 2 and when calculating the entropy we will consider the single
bytes the characters in our alphabet.
Table 2: The classification algorithms consisting of model and feature set choice
used in this paper
Model
Feature set Multinomial Neural Network Random Forest
Query Name Entropy, Name Length and
IP Packet Length of queries only
Name Entropy, Name Length and
IP Packet Length of queries only
Full Name Entropy, Name Length and
IP Packet Length of queries and re-
sponses together
Name Entropy, Name Length and
IP Packet Length of queries and re-
sponses together
Response Name Entropy, Name Length and
IP Packet Length of responses only
Name Entropy, Name Length and
IP Packet Length of responses only
The statistical significance of the results is ensured with a Friedman test [15].
This tests whether the classification is significantly different in accuracy between
the algorithms. The null hypothesis is that there are no differences in classifi-
cation accuracy between the algorithms. If the null hypothesis is rejected the
Friedman test will be followed by a post-hoc test evaluating whether the clas-
sification of the algorithms are different from the algorithm using Multinomial
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Neural Networks and the Homem and Papapetrou [19] feature set. The post-hoc
test will use the Holm step-down procedure [18].
In the Friedman test the algorithms are assigned ranks for each data-set, the
best is assigned rank 1, the second rank 2..., ties are assigned the average of the
ranks. We assign the ranks after the accuracy of the different algorithms for each
fold. The Friedman statistic,
χ2F =
12N
k(k + 1)

∑
j
R2j −
k(k + 1)2
4

 (1)
where Rj =
1
N
∑
i r
j
i and r
j
i is the rank of the i’th of the k algorithms and the
j’th of the N datasets, is used to calculate FF [15].
FF =
(N − 1)χ2F
N(k − 1)− χ2F
(2)
FF is distributed according to the F -distribution with k − 1 and (k − 1)(N −
1) degrees of freedom [21]. The FF is compared to the critical value of this
F -distribution with α = 0.05. If FF is bigger than the critical value the null
hypothesis is rejected. The null hypothesis is that there are no difference of
accuracy between the algorithms. The post-hoc test checks whether there is a
significant difference the chosen algorithms. The test statistic for comparing an
algorithm to our set algorithm, here given index 0 is
zi = (Ri −R0)
/√
k(k + 1)
6N
(3)
The zi-values are used to find their respective pi-values whether the zi follows
the normal distribution with mean 0 and standard deviation (SE)
√
k(k+1)
6N . In
accordance to the Holm’s step-down test the pi-values are sorted and the indices
are reassigned such that pi ≤ pj for all i, j ∈ Z
≥1, i < j. These pi values are
checked algorithm for algorithm in the order of the indices whether the pi-value
is lower than the α/(k − i), for the chosen significance level α. If pi < α/(k− 1)
then the null hypothesis is rejected, ie there is a significant difference between
the i and the 0 algorithm. This is continued until a pi is unable to reject the null
hypothesis, all following null hypothesis are then accepted. [18,12]
3.2 Data sets
The DNS-tunneled data was generated in a controlled environment.234 This is
since abusing the DNS-protocol can be considered malicious or even illegal. The
2 https://s3.eu-central-1.wasabisys.com/dns-tunneling/dns tunnel sftp.pcapng
3 https://s3.eu-central-1.wasabisys.com/dns-tunneling/dns tunnel ssh.pcapng
4 https://s3.eu-central-1.wasabisys.com/dns-tunneling/dns tunnel telnet.pcapng
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non-DNS-tunneled data is a dataset collected and provided by CAIDA (Center
for Applied Internet Data Analysis) at the University of California San Diego
(UCSD) for research purposes. This data is used in accordance with their CAIDA
Acceptable Use Agreement [30,31]. The dataset consists of approximately one
GiB of DNS traffic in pcap files compressed by GNU Zip. The data will be
classified according to what type of protocol it DNS-tunnels and a class for
all non-tunneled DNS-traffic. From the datasets the specified features is then
extracted and used to train the models.
4 Results
For this study we created our own dataset of DNS-tunneled traffic. To create the
dataset we set up an authoritative DNS server for the domain dnshax.se running
the DNS-tunneling softwareDNSCat2 5, a set of virtual computers, hosted on one
of our own computers, to control through the DNS-tunnel. On the host computer
running the virtual computers we recorded the network traffic on the DNS-
protocol with the tool tcpdump6 for the virtual computers specific IP-addresses.
The total size of the dataset is > 4Gb worth of recorded .pcap files. When
the feature set had been extracted from the .pcap files into comma separated
text files the total size was ≈ 229Mb indicating a 95% reduction in space re-
quirements. This could have been reduced even further by storing the extracted
features in a binary format. Our network forensics tool were coded in python,
using the scapy7 framework for the feature extraction; for the models we used
implementations from the scikit-learn8 framework with the default settings for
the respective models.
The extracted features we used for this experiment had 1 101 594 features,
that is responses and queries, per tested protocol totaling 4 406 376 features in
all the feature sets. These were all crunched through the respective models with
the results detailed below.
4.1 Results on query and response pair
As can be seen in table 3 none of the models have problem distinguishing normal
DNS traffic from malicious traffic as the Precision and Recall are both 1.000.
Among the tunneled protocols SFTP was the one that was easiest to spot for
both models when using the combination of query and response pairs with pre-
cision at 1.000 and recall at 0.999 for both models as can be seen in table 3.
Both models have problem distinguishing between tunneled SSH and Telnet
traffic when using both queries and responses in the feature set as can be seen
in table 3. The neural networks recall is really low for Telnet at 0.345 compared
to the random forest at 0.610.
5 https://github.com/iagox86/dnscat2
6 https://www.tcpdump.org/
7 https://scapy.net/
8 https://scikit-learn.org
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Table 3: The evaluation metrics of the models using the full feature set presented
in table 2
Feature sets Full
Models Neural Network Random Forest
Protocols
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DNS 1.000 1.000
0.830
1.000 1.000
0.839
SFTP 1.000 0.999 1.000 0.999
SSH 0.599 0.977 0.657 0.747
TELNET 0.936 0.345 0.706 0.610
Accuracy is a respectable 0.830 for the Neural Network and 0.839 for the
Random Forest for the entire feature set over all the protocols.
4.2 Results on query feature set
Table 4: The evaluation metrics of the models using the query feature set pre-
sented in table 2
Feature sets Query
Models Neural Network Random Forest
Protocols
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DNS 1.000 1.000
0.819
1.000 1.000
0.817
SFTP 0.972 0.997 0.971 0.998
SSH 0.598 0.941 0.629 0.730
TELNET 0.850 0.340 0.667 0.540
When only using the queries in training the models they still have no problem
spotting the normal DNS traffic as it is still at 1.000 for Precision and Recall for
both models as can be seen in table 4. Both models also produce similar results
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for SFTP with only minor differences between them when only using the query
feature set with Precision > 0.97 and Recall close to 1.000.
When only using the query feature set both models still have problems dif-
ferentiating between tunneled SSH and Telnet traffic as can be seen in table 4.
Both models have a fairly low Recall for Telnet at 0.340 for the Neural Network
and 0.540 got the Random Forest.
The accuracy for both models on only the query feature set is slightly lower
than the results for both queries and responses at 0.819 for the Neural Network
and 0.817 for the Random Forest.
4.3 Results on response feature set
Table 5: The evaluation metrics of the models using the response feature set
presented in table 2
Feature sets Response
Models Neural Network Random Forest
Protocols
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DNS 0.998 0.994
0.585
0.999 0.999
0.821
SFTP 0.404 0.657 1.000 0.999
SSH 0.415 0.302 0.634 0.677
TELNET 0.593 0.385 0.651 0.608
When looking in table 5 we can see that both models are just shy of 1.000
in precision and recall for normal DNS traffic. What really stands out though
compared to the results in sections 4.1 and 4.2 is that the Neural Network
performs really bad for spotting SFTP traffic at a precision and recall of 0.404
and 0.657 respectively compared to the Random Forest at 1.000 and 0.999.
For the other protocols the Neural Network performs worse than the Random
Forest although not as badly as for SFTP as can be seen in table 5. The Neural
Networks lack of performance when only using the responses as the feature set
lands the models on an accuracy of 0.585 and 0.821 respectively.
4.4 Significance analysis
The results from the Friedman test and the post-hoc analysis are presented
in table 6. The F -distributed FF statistic, derived from the Friedman statistic
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Table 6: The results of the Friedman test and the post-hoc Holm step-down
procedure
∑
i
R2i = 89.089, N = 20, k = 6, χ
2
F = 89.079
FF = 154.970, df1 = 5, df2 = 95, α = 0.05, FF critical value = 2.310
i Algorithm z = (Ri −R0) /SE p α/(k − i)
1 Response, Neural Network 7.429 0.000 0.01
2 Full, Random Forest -6.857 0.000 0.013
3 Query, Random Forest 3.786 0.000 0.017
4 Full, Neural Network -3.286 0.000 0.025
5 Response, Random Forest 0.643 0.211 0.05
(χ2F ), is bigger than the critical value and the first null hypothesis is therefore
rejected, ie there exists a significant difference in accuracy between the different
classification algorithms. Further the post-hoc analysis were unable to reject the
null hypothesis that the classification algorithm using the responses feature set
and Random Forest model are not significantly different. All the other algorithms
were shown to be significantly different from the algorithm using Multinomial
Neural Network with the Homem and Papapetrou [19] feature-set.
5 Conclusions
In our results we have shown that predictive models can predict network traffic
as can be seen in tables 3, 4, 5 and 6. Although there are differences between the
different models and protocols our results clearly show that predictive models
can, and do, predict tunneled network traffic.
We have also shown that the models do perform better when combining
the queries with the corresponding responses instead of only using queries or
responses when trying to predict network traffic.
The amount of data needed to store for analyzing network traffic is reduced
by 95% and could be reduced even more, mitigating several storage and privacy
issues.
Also, when using only queries or responses, the models have variable perfor-
mance, i.e. one model is better at predicting traffic than the other on a specific
feature set, suggesting the model is the determinant, not the feature set.
References
1. Domain names - concepts and facilities. Tech. Rep. 1034 (nov 1987),
https://rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc1034.txt
2. Domain names - implementation and specification. Tech. Rep. 1035 (nov 1987),
https://rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc1035.txt
3. Alpaydin, E.: Introduction to machine learning. MIT press (2009)
12
4. Alshammari, R., Zincir-Heywood, A.N.: Can encrypted traffic be identified without
port numbers, ip addresses and payload inspection? Computer networks 55(6),
1326–1350 (2011)
5. Anguita, D., Ghio, A., Ridella, S., Sterpi, D.: K-fold cross validation for error rate
estimate in support vector machines. In: DMIN. pp. 291–297 (2009)
6. Arndt, C.: Information Measures: Information and Its Description in Science and
Engineering. Springer, Heidelberg (2001)
7. Berners-Lee, T.: Rfc 1630, universal resource identifiers in www. Tech. rep. (1994),
https://rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc1630.txt
8. Born, K., Gustafson, D.: Detecting dns tunnels using character frequency analysis.
arXiv preprint arXiv:1004.4358 (2010)
9. Breiman, L.: Random forests. Machine learning 45(1), 5–32 (2001)
10. Damas, J., Graff, M., Vixie, P.A.: Extension Mechanisms for DNS. Tech. Rep. 6891
(apr 2013), https://rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc6891.txt
11. Davidoff, S., Ham, J.: Network Forensics: Tracking Hackers through Cyberspace.
Pearson Education, Inc. (2012)
12. Demsˇar, J.: Statistical comparisons of classifiers over multiple data sets. Journal
of Machine learning research 7(Jan), 1–30 (2006)
13. Dietrich, C.J., Rossow, C., Freiling, F.C., Bos, H., v. Steen, M., Pohlmann, N.:
On botnets that use dns for command and control. In: 2011 Seventh European
Conference on Computer Network Defense. pp. 9–16 (Sep 2011)
14. Dusi, M., Crotti, M., Gringoli, F., Salgarelli, L.: Tunnel hunter: Detecting
application-layer tunnels with statistical fingerprinting. Computer Networks 53(1),
81 – 97 (2009)
15. Friedman, M.: A comparison of alternative tests of significance for the problem of
m rankings. The Annals of Mathematical Statistics 11(1), 86–92 (1940)
16. Golafshani, N.: Understanding reliability and validity in qualitative research. The
qualitative report 8(4), 597–606 (2003)
17. Hjelmvik, E., John, W.: Breaking and improving protocol obfuscation. Chalmers
University of Technology, Tech. Rep 123751 (2010)
18. Holm, S.: A simple sequentially rejective multiple test procedure. Scandinavian
journal of statistics pp. 65–70 (1979)
19. Homem, I., Papapetrou, P.: Harnessing predictive models for assisting network
forensic investigations of dns tunnels. In: Proceedings of the Conference on Digital
Forensics, Security and Law. pp. 79–93. Association of Digital Forensics, Security
and Law (2017)
20. Homem, I., Papapetrou, P., Dosis, S.: Entropy-based prediction of network proto-
cols in the forensic analysis of dns tunnels. arXiv preprint arXiv:1709.06363 (2017)
21. Iman, R.L., Davenport, J.M.: Approximations of the critical region of the fbietkan
statistic. Communications in Statistics-Theory and Methods 9(6), 571–595 (1980)
22. Khan, S., Gani, A., Wahab, A.W.A., Shiraz, M., Ahmad, I.: Network forensics:
Review, taxonomy, and open challenges. Journal of Network and Computer Appli-
cations 66, 214 – 235 (2016)
23. Kullback, S., Leibler, R.A.: On information and sufficiency. The annals of mathe-
matical statistics 22(1), 79–86 (1951)
24. Liao, N., Tian, S., Wang, T.: Network forensics based on fuzzy logic and expert
system. Computer Communications 32(17), 1881–1892 (2009)
25. Nadler, A., Aminov, A., Shabtai, A.: Detection of malicious and low throughput
data exfiltration over the dns protocol. Computers & Security 80, 36–53 (2019)
26. Nanopoulos, A., Alcock, R., Manolopoulos, Y.: Feature-based classification of time-
series data. International Journal of Computer Research 10, 49–61 (2001)
13
27. Palmer, G., et al.: A road map for digital forensic research. In: First Digital Forensic
Research Workshop, Utica, New York. pp. 27–30 (2001)
28. Postel, J., et al.: Rfc 791: Internet protocol. Tech. Rep. 791 (sep 1981),
https://rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc791.txt
29. Reed, R.D., Marks, R.J.: Neural Smithing: Supervised Learning in Feedforward
Artificial Neural Networks. MIT Press (1999)
30. UCSD, C.: Quarterly 2014-4 dns-traffic (2014),
http://data.caida.org/datasets/topology/ark/ipv4/dns-traffic/\quarterly/2014-04/,
[Online; Accessed 2019-02-11]
31. UCSD, C.: The ipv4 routed /24 topology dataset (2019),
https://www.caida.org/data/active/ipv4 routed 24 topology dataset.xml, [On-
line; Accessed 2019-02-19]
32. Xu, K., Butler, P., Saha, S., Yao, D.: Dns for massive-scale command and control.
IEEE Transactions on Dependable and Secure Computing 10(3), 143–153 (May
2013)
33. Ylonen, T., Lonvick, C.: The secure shell (ssh) protocol architecture. Tech. rep.
(2005), https://rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc4253.txt
34. Zadeh, L.A., et al.: Fuzzy sets. Information and control 8(3), 338–353 (1965)
14
